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Abstract Research on differences between public, for-
profit, and nonprofit providers of welfare services has
provided mixed findings, depending on welfare state
arrangement, regulation, and service area. This paper’s
objective is to study the differences between public, non-
profit (cooperatives and other nonprofits), and for-profit
welfare providers from the perspective of the users in the
tightly regulated Scandinavian context. We ask how the
users perceive the providers from different sectors differ-
ently and how this variation can be explained. The study
relies on a large-scale survey carried out in 2015 in the city
of Oslo, Norway. From the survey, we identify the two
main results. First, despite limited differences, users of
nonprofit kindergartens are generally more satisfied than
users of for-profit and public kindergartens. Second, an
important explanation for variations in user satisfaction
among kindergartens is identified in a pocket of regulatory
leniency: the quality of food service. This is the only
expense that varies among kindergartens in Norway. These
results indicate that more lenient regulations could poten-
tially increase provider distinctiveness. Based on the
existing literature, we discuss why nonprofit providers
seem to fare better in the minds of users than public and
for-profit providers.
Keywords Kindergarten  Nonprofit provision 
Cooperatives  Scandinavia  User satisfaction  Welfare
Introduction
Does it matter to users whether public, for-profit, or non-
profit providers deliver publicly funded welfare services?
This is a core question in nonprofit scholarship, underpin-
ning much of the motivation behind studies of the nonprofit
providers. It is also a fundamental issue for policymakers
making judgments about the mix of providers in the wel-
fare models.
Yet, a review of the empirical literature shows that it is
not possible to give a general answer to the question.
Differences between the three sectors depend on institu-
tional features of the welfare model, regulation, and service
area. Furthermore, few empirical studies have differenti-
ated between private nonprofit and private for-profit pro-
viders, and a majority of the studies has been conducted in
the US context. Consequently, existing research has a
limited scope and there is a need for research that maps
variations in different aspects of services in various
contexts.
This paper’s objective is to study differences in user
satisfaction between public, nonprofit, and for-profit wel-
fare providers in the Scandinavian welfare context, which
is characterized by a strong demand for equality obtained
through public financing and regulation. The study con-
tributes on at least two fronts. First, the particularities of
nonprofit provision of welfare services are an understudied
topic in the Scandinavian welfare states. The study con-
tributes to a growing literature on recent developments in
the Scandinavian welfare mix, characterized by a growth in
for-profit providers of welfare, which are more or less fully
financed by public (tax) money. This literature largely
ignores the nonprofits as an independent sector (Petersen
and Hjelmar 2014). Second, we use an outcome variable
that is intuitively important for the stakeholders—the
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users—and that has become a core issue in the public
debate among policymakers.
Our case is kindergartens in Oslo, Norway, which is an
ideal example in the Scandinavian context of a case where
all three types of providers play important roles: all pro-
viders are available for practically all citizens, and
kindergartens are a core welfare service that the govern-
ment regulates as such. We rely on an underutilized data
source: Surveys distributed annually by the city of Oslo on
user satisfaction in most service areas. The kindergarten
survey is distributed to parents in all public kindergartens,
as well as most for-profit and nonprofit kindergartens,
reaching a sample size of more than 20,000. To our
knowledge, the surveys have never been used in academic
research, and the present study demonstrates the usefulness
and limitations of user surveys as a tool to understand
differences in the welfare mix—the division of public, for-
profit, and nonprofit providers.
Background
Different Service Providers
Despite the limitations of present empirical research, the
theoretical literature offers different predictions in terms of
variations in service quality between public, nonprofit, and
for-profit providers. A classic incentive-based argument is
that any institution lacking a profit motive will produce
‘‘economic waste’’ in the form of unnecessary benefits to
employees or other organizational excesses (Fama and
Jensen 1983). Accordingly, public and nonprofit providers
that have goals other than profit maximization may become
inefficient and can thus expect lower quality than for-
profits (Enjolras 2009: 774). One consequence of this line
of thinking is the dismantling of the (quasi-monopolist)
public sector by way of ‘‘privatizing’’ the provision of
services (Wollmann 2014).
An important critique against incentive-based arguments
is that incentives favor easily measurable ‘‘visible’’ quali-
ties, while neglecting ‘‘invisible’’ qualities, which are often
difficult to measure. While for-profit providers lack an
incentive to prioritize invisible quality, nonprofits have
managers and employees more dedicated to the service
objective (instead of profit generation), and this gives
incentives for improved quality production (Roomkin and
Weisbrod 1999; Hansmann 1987). Moreover, the theoret-
ical literature often cited in nonprofit scholarship will
typically argue that nonprofit providers can contribute with
plurality in service content and thus deliver services more
in line with individual preferences (Weisbrod 1978).
‘‘Nonprofit’’ is a heterogeneous category, including
different types of organizations. Stakeholder theory
hypothesizes that user-controlled nonprofits (e.g., cooper-
atives) have dedication to quality as their prime priority
(Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen 1991) and thus provide
better quality. A number of contributions suggest that
cooperatives may be more beneficial than other nonprofits
that do not have the same user-centered approach (Spear
2000; Novkovic 2008; Leviten-Reid 2012).
As noted above, empirical studies have rendered the
mixed results as to what the differences are between pro-
viders. There seems to be an important variation between
the providers depending on the regulatory regime (Leviten-
Reid 2012: 38), rendering different findings in different
models of welfare states (Caitlin 2014; Petersen et al.
2018); there is a variation between types of services
(Petersen et al. 2015), and different types of providers have
found to have different kinds of qualities (Salamon and
Toepler 2015). Furthermore, there is a tendency in the
literature to study differences between ‘‘public’’ and ‘‘pri-
vate’’ providers, not differentiating between for-profit,
public, and nonprofit providers. There are few empirical
studies from Scandinavia that systematically differentiate
between public, for-profit, and nonprofit providers. This is
surprising, given the fact that nonprofits played a pivotal
role in establishing the Scandinavian welfare states and
historically have been an important partner with the public
sector, at least in Norway and Denmark (Kuhnle and Selle
1990; Sivesind and Trætteberg 2017). In a review of extant
studies on home care for the elderly, provision of child
care, and the operation of nursing homes, Petersen and
Hjelmar (2014) found no evidence of differences between
private and public providers in terms of price and quality,
dovetailing with most other studies and reviews of various
service areas in the Scandinavian context (Hartman 2011;
Bogen 2011; Feltenius 2017; Meagher and Szebehely
2013). Only a few studies have distinguished between for-
profit and nonprofit actors, and these have mostly been
unable to draw robust conclusions about their differences
(Gautun et al. 2013; Trætteberg 2015; Linde´n et al. 2017).
The literature comparing nonprofit, for-profit, and public
kindergartens is dominated by American data that have
mostly studied different forms of process quality. These
studies diverge in terms of design and conclusions, making
it difficult to derive a coherent summary. Some find quality
differences related to the sector of the provider (Morris and
Helburn 2000; Sosinsky et al. 2007), or that there are no
such differences (Mocan 1997), while others find that
structural features like regulation (Phillipsen et al. 1997),
market structure (Cleveland and Krashinsky 2009), or both
(Koning et al. 2007) determine performance differences
between for-profit and nonprofit providers.
In a study comparing cooperatives with other nonprofits
and with for-profits, Leviten-Reid (2012) found no differ-
ences in terms of quality of service in the kindergartens.
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She could, however, document greater parental involve-
ment in cooperatives. It is also striking that greater parental
participation in boards was a predictor for quality. In
Norway, parents normally control the board in parent-
owned cooperative kindergartens.
Studies based on North American data do not neces-
sarily travel easily to Europe, where the public sector plays
a much more important role in the welfare mix. Studying
kindergartens in Sweden, Vamstad (2012) found that par-
ents in cooperative (nonprofit) childcare facilities were
more content with services than parents in public institu-
tions. In this study, for-profit providers were not included.
A study comparing quality based on ethnographic obser-
vations in kindergartens found no differences between
public and private providers in Norway (Bjørnestad and Os
2018). The study did not differentiate between nonprofit
and for-profit providers. To our knowledge, only Linde´n
et al. (2017) have made comparisons of kindergartens in all
three sectors in Scandinavia. They found somewhat higher
user satisfaction among users of for-profit, compared with
nonprofit, kindergartens in Norway. However, due to data
limitations (few observations), the study failed to produce
statistically significant differences between providers when
controlling for users’ sociodemographic characteristics.
What these studies reveal is that the differences between
public, nonprofit, and for-profit providers depend on the
institutional setting, and that the broad expectations that
can be inferred from the theoretical literature is difficult to
identify in empirical studies. Moreover, in spite of these
differences being at the core of nonprofit scholarship, there
is a limited amount of relevant studies from which to build
expectations. Due to the important role of institutional
features of the welfare model, it is necessary to examine
the differences between public, for-profit, and nonprofit
providers across service areas and welfare models and to be
specific about which aspect of the provision one wants to
understand. In this paper, we contribute by investigating
parental satisfaction within the Scandinavian welfare
context.
Civil Society and the Welfare State in Norway
The Norwegian (and Scandinavian) societal model
encompasses a distinct welfare component and a civil
society component, which are intertwined. The Scandina-
vian model of civil society is characterized by a high level
of citizen participation in voluntary organizations, mea-
sured in terms of memberships and in volunteers (Hen-
riksen et al. 2019). Voluntary organizations have
traditionally recruited broadly and have been important for
social integration and equality (Enjolras and Strømsnes
2018). During the expansion of the welfare state in the
after-war period, civil society organizations played a major
role in the provision of welfare services and constituted an
important practical and ideological alternative to the state,
while the market was not yet a relevant player (Selle et al.
2018).
Over the last few decades, however, service provision
has been professionalized with paid staff delivering most
services. Moreover, for-profit market actors have gained
importance in the welfare mix, propelled partly by new
public management reforms that have come to dominate
the relations between the state as a funder and the non-
public providers (Selle et al. 2018). Parallel with the
growth of the welfare state, Scandinavian civil societies
have increasingly become dominated by leisure organiza-
tions, and organizations providing welfare services con-
stitute a moderate share of the organizational landscape
(Henriksen et al. 2019). Yet, as the Norwegian nonprofit
providers have lost its relative position over the last dec-
ades, they remain an important part of the welfare mix with
approximately 80% of the welfare market as a whole.
Moreover, the nonprofit sector has grown substantially in
real numbers over the last decades as the entire welfare
sector has expanded. For-profit growth has come mainly at
the expense of the public sector (Sivesind 2017). The
nonprofit kindergartens represent a wide set of institutions
like local diaconal kindergartens, cooperatives, small
foundations, and one big chain of nonprofit kindergartens.
What sets the nonprofit kindergartens apart from nonprofit
service providers in other service areas is that there are
mostly local cooperatives where the parents own the one
kindergarten their child attends and other small nonprofit
entities. Few kindergartens are part of big national orga-
nizations like those that we find, for example, in care for
the elderly, where big national professional organizations
dominate among the nonprofits.
Equity in service quality is historically one of the central
features of the Scandinavian model (Rothstein 1998).
Traditionally, key strategies to obtain equal service quality
for all citizens have been in place through the state: public
financing, public regulation, and public provision of core
welfare services (Fritzell et al. 2005). The nonprofit sector
has played an important role alongside the state, but
overall, the welfare mix in Scandinavia is probably domi-
nated more by the public sector than in any other western
region (Anheier and Salamon 2006; Salamon et al. 2004).
In order to uphold the egalitarian ideals of the welfare
model while increasing the use of NPM and for-profit
providers, the state heavily subsidizes and regulates the
private contractors. This is probably an important expla-
nation as to why some studies have found smaller differ-
ences between private and public providers in Scandinavia
than in Anglo-Saxon countries (Caitlin 2014). A prereq-
uisite enabling non-public providers to deviate from the
public norm is that they have a certain degree of
Voluntas (2020) 31:153–167 155
123
administrative freedom to develop distinctive services and
that users are free to choose a provider that fits their
preferences (Sivesind et al. 2017).
Measuring ‘‘Quality’’ Through User Satisfaction
The practice of conducting user satisfaction surveys on
public services is a relatively new phenomenon, one that
became widespread in the USA in the 1990s and then
subsequently in Europe (Linde´n et al. 2017: 262).
The use of user surveys to inform us about sector dif-
ferences must be done with careful interpretation. Although
some studies (e.g., Charbonneau and Van Ryzin 2012)
have demonstrated that user surveys and objective indica-
tors correspond, other studies suggest we should be careful
when assuming a consistent relationship between perfor-
mance, experienced performance, and satisfaction (An-
dersen and Hjortskov 2016). There are various reasons for
this. First, answers on a user survey can be based on users’
predispositions and expectations, not necessarily on aspects
of the provider (James 2007). Second, in the case of
kindergartens, users are next of kin (parents), visiting
kindergartens for a very limited part of the time when their
children are present. Third, although users formally have
freedom in choosing kindergartens, in practice, there is
often a supply shortage. Therefore, most parents accept
what they can get, as long as it is near their homes. Thus,
while parents’ free choice is a formal right, it is not nec-
essarily always a reality. Fourth, the supply of for-profit
and nonprofit kindergartens might not be equal across
neighborhoods in Oslo. Findings from Sweden show that
for-profit and nonprofit schools are more likely to be found
in wealthy neighborhoods, leaving poorer neighborhoods
primarily to public providers (Gustafsson et al. 2016: 51).
We can remedy some of this by controlling for neighbor-
hood wealth in the analysis, but we cannot fully rule out
problems in selection bias.
Even if user satisfaction is not a perfect measure of
actual ‘‘quality,’’ it is a component of perceived quality and
an important part of the big picture when assessing a ser-
vice area. It is also an important aspect to study in its own
right. In the case of kindergartens, parents are responsible
for their children, and it is their right and privilege to make
good decisions on their child’s behalf. Since information is
a key factor in any purchase of a service, a user survey
captures the assessment done by users with their available
information. Welfare services are services where quality is
inherently difficult to assess (Moberg et al. 2016; Ben-Ner
et al. 2018). The reputation of the providers is therefore a
key factor, and there are few comparative indicators
available for parents seeking information about kinder-
gartens (Vlassopoulos 2009). The importance of user sur-
veys in this regard is underlined by the observation that
many kindergartens use the results from the surveys to
promote their kindergarten in order to attract more clients.
The results from user surveys are thus instrumental to the
dynamic between the nonprofit, for-profit, and public sec-
tors. In effect, the surveys might affect user choice among
parents searching for a proper kindergarten for their
children.
The Case: Kindergartens in Oslo
Kindergartens in Oslo represent a good case to illustrate the
differences between public, nonprofit, and for-profit pro-
viders in the Scandinavian welfare context. To make gen-
eral inferences about satisfaction with different sectors, it is
beneficial that all sectors have a certain share of the market
and are not only catering to niches in the margins of the
citizenry. This situation is usually not common in Scan-
dinavia (Sivesind 2017), but kindergartens in Oslo are one
of the exceptions in that all three sectors have an important
share: Public providers constitute about half of the market,
whereas for-profit and nonprofit providers share the other
half. Kindergartens are a service area with considerable
public regulation, like all welfare in Norway, but the
flexibility in the public guidance is larger than in, for
example, hospitals and elderly care, and all kindergartens
are subject to the same national legislation, unlike, for
example, schools in Norway and Denmark. Both the mar-
ket situation and the national legislation thus make
kindergartens a suitable case for studies of sector differ-
ences in Scandinavian welfare.
In Norway, kindergartens—also referred to as day care
centers1—are voluntary to use, but widely seen as a natural
first step on the educational ladder (Trætteberg and Lide´n
2018). Most children in Norway enroll in kindergartens at
the age of one, and more than 99% of children attend
kindergartens at some point before being enrolled in
compulsory schooling at the age of six (Moafi 2017). Most
kindergartens offer services to children in all age groups
between one and six.
Kindergartens are a municipal service, which means that
even if regulation is mostly national, municipalities run
public kindergartens and are responsible for the funding
and supervision of non-public kindergartens. Oslo—the
nation’s capital and the largest municipality in Norway—is
a particularly relevant case to study for at least two reasons.
First, Oslo is densely populated, and most families can find
public, nonprofit, and for-profit kindergartens near their
homes. In theory, there is free choice with kindergartens,
1 In this paper we use the term ‘‘kindergarten,’’ which is in line with
what public authorities in Norway use in official documents (see, for
example, Ministry of Education and Research: https://www.regjerin
gen.no/en/topics/families-and-children/kindergarden/id1029/).
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meaning parents can apply to any kindergarten they want.
All kindergartens are listed with key information on the
city of Oslo website. However, as discussed above, due to
capacity shortages, real user choice is sometimes limited.
Approximately, one-third of the kindergartens are non-
profit, something that enables us to examine both parent-
owned cooperatives and other nonprofits separately. Sec-
ond, in accordance with national legislation, regardless of
service provider, the fee that parents pay for a kindergarten
is capped at a relatively low level. However, kindergartens
can charge extra for food service, which has resulted in
significant variations: Some kindergartens charge no extra
fee and expect kids to bring lunchboxes, while others offer
warm meals every day and increase the total payment by as
much as 30%. To keep costs for parents low, the city of
Oslo has prohibited public kindergartens from charging
more than what it costs to offer a simple meal with bread
every day. In this way, the city has put a straitjacket on one
of the areas in which national regulation leaves the most
room for kindergartens to adapt services to parents’
preferences.
Thus, food service is the one important exception to the
maximum fee kindergartens are allowed to charge parents,
and it is particularly interesting to see whether differences
in user satisfaction are related to food service. It is likely
that for-profit and nonprofit providers on average offer
more expensive food services because they find this to be
in line with parents’ preferences. Therefore, one would
expect that users of for-profits and nonprofits are more
satisfied with the food service than users of public
kindergartens, which, in turn, might lead to higher user
satisfaction overall.
Data and Methods
We rely on a large-scale survey on user satisfaction with
kindergartens, carried out in Oslo in 2015. The survey was
distributed to parents with children in all public kinder-
gartens, as well as most for-profit and nonprofit kinder-
gartens. Parents provided unique answers for each
individual child, reaching a sample size of more than
24,000. In 2015, nearly 37,000 children were enrolled in
kindergartens in Oslo, indicating that about 65% of users
responded to the survey.2 The survey was developed and
administered by the city administration, and although cer-
tain non-public kindergartens did not take part, the vast
majority of parents with children in a kindergarten were
invited to participate. There is a possibility that non-public
kindergartens not participating in the survey deviate from
those participating, but, unfortunately, we do not have
information on the kindergartens that did not participate. If
there are systematic differences, one might expect poor-
performing kindergartens to avoid participating in the
survey, leading to somewhat inflated satisfaction scores
among non-public kindergartens. We do, however, believe
this to be a minor problem, as the vast majority of the
kindergartens participated. As shown in Table 1, the share
of non-public kindergartens in the sample is fairly similar
to the real distribution of kindergartens in Oslo.
The survey included several questions measuring user
satisfaction with different aspects of kindergartens, making
it possible to study whether different providers have dis-
tinct qualities. Furthermore, as will be described in more
detail below, we added contextual data on each kinder-
garten and the geographical area in which each kinder-
garten is located.
Due to the hierarchical structure of the data set, we
employed three-level linear regression models, in which
Level 1 comprises individual responses, Level 2 includes
characteristics of each kindergarten, and Level 3 is the
neighborhood where various kindergartens are located.
Dependent Variables
To study whether different providers have distinct quali-
ties, we constructed five different dependent variables on
user satisfaction:
General satisfaction consists of mean responses on two
general items (‘‘All in all, are you satisfied with your
daycare center?’’3 and ‘‘Would you recommend your
daycare center to others?’’). Answers to each single item
were provided on a scale of 1 (‘‘Dissatisfied’’) to 6
(‘‘Satisfied’’).
In addition to these general items, the questionnaire
consisted of 26 items measuring satisfaction with more
detailed features of the kindergartens, using the same 1–6
scale. A principal component factor analysis revealed that
23 of these items cluster in four separate factors (one item
loads on two factors, whereas two items do not load on any
factor). We constructed four dependent variables based on
mean scores on the variables comprising these factors. The
results from the factor analysis and exact question wording
of each item are displayed in Table 4 in Appendix.
Educational development (Factor 1) comprises seven
items that all measure the role that kindergartens have as
educational institutions, where children develop physical,
social, and cognitive skills, in addition to language.
Care and safe feeling (Factor 2) comprises seven items
that center around how parents perceive the care given to
their children, i.e., whether the children are happy, have
2 Numbers retrieved from Statistics Norway.
3 Even though public authorities in Norway use the term ‘‘kinder-
garten,’’ the English version of the questionnaire used the term
‘‘daycare center.’’
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good relations with staff and other children, and are gen-
erally looked after in a satisfying manner.
Information and user influence (Factor 3) comprises five
items about the information that parents receive regarding
the day-to-day operation of the kindergarten and changes
that take place generally, as well as the development of the
child specifically.
Physical infrastructure (Factor 4) comprises four items
measuring whether indoor and outdoor facilities are satis-
fying for development, playing, and learning, as well as the
quality of hygiene and venue security standards.
The five dependent variables are highly correlated, with
correlation coefficients ranging from r = 0.58 (Factor 3
and Factor 4) to 0.80 (general satisfaction and Factor 2),
indicating that generally satisfied users express high satis-
faction with a kindergarten regardless of what feature is
measured.
Independent Variables
We constructed independent variables on three levels. The
survey did not include many background variables, but on
the individual level (Level 1), we included controls for age
of the child (0–6 years) and dummy identifying users with
short experience, i.e., children who first entered kinder-
garten during the most recent year.
On the kindergarten level (Level 2), the principal vari-
able is provider, which distinguishes between public, for-
profit, nonprofit parent cooperatives and other nonprofit
providers. The city of Oslo owns all public kindergartens.
Other nonprofit providers comprise mainly charities, vol-
untary organizations, and diaconal institutions, whereas
for-profit kindergartens are mostly joint-stock companies in
which some are part of big chains of kindergartens, while
others are independent or have owners who own only a few
institutions.
Family- and employer-supported kindergartens were
excluded from the analyses, as these do not fit well within
any of the main categories. Family kindergartens typically
consist of an independent childminder looking after a small
number of children for a limited time, often in the child-
minder’s own home. It is a substantively different form of
service than the regular kindergartens. Employer-supported
kindergartens are owned and operated by firms, and all
users are employees of those firms. The kindergartens
themselves are not different from regular kindergartens, but
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Dependent variables Mean SD Min Max n
General satisfaction 5.20 0.97 1 6 22,238
Educational development (Factor 1) 5.00 0.85 1 6 22,214
Care and safe feeling (Factor 2) 5.27 0.74 1 6 22,229
Information and user influence (Factor 3) 4.80 0.96 1 6 22,137
Physical infrastructure (Factor 4) 4.93 0.92 1 6 22,105
Independent variables—level 1
Age of child 3.10 1.38 0 6 22,238
First year 0.24 0.43 0 1 22,238
Level 2
Public 0.56 – 0 1 530
For-profit 0.21 – 0 1 530
Parent cooperatives 0.08 – 0 1 530
Other nonprofits 0.15 – 0 1 530
Share of educational supervisors 0.56 0.11 0.26 1 530
Areal 5.15 1.35 2.40 11 530
Food cost per month
0–199 NOK 0.65 – 0 1
200–299 NOK 0.10 – 0 1 530
300–399 NOK 0.16 – 0 1 530
400–499 NOK 0.05 – 0 1 530
500 ? NOK 0.04 – 0 1 530
Total number of children 59.14 33.33 7 200 530
Children per FTE 5.90 0.61 1.2 7.5 530
Level 3
ln community wealth 0.49 0.14 0.16 1 274
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their financial situation and user selection make them dif-
ficult to compare. This is a relatively marginal offer as only
very few employers have their own kindergartens.
Another key variable on the kindergarten level is food
cost per month, which, as mentioned above, is the only
expense that varies among kindergartens. Food cost per
month is likely to be correlated with the quality of food
service in the kindergartens. It correlates with an item in
the survey concerning satisfaction as to whether kinder-
gartens ‘‘focused on health and a healthy diet.’’ This
variable did not load on any of the factors we estimated to
construct dependent variables (see Table 4). The mean
score on this item is 4.6 (on a 1–6 scale) in kindergartens
with NOK 0–199 in monthly food cost, 5.0 in kindergartens
with NOK 300–399 in monthly food cost, and 5.3 in
kindergartens with NOK 500 ? in monthly food cost.
Additional variables on the kindergarten level are
overall size (total number of children), number of children
per employee (FTE: full-time equivalent), share of educa-
tional supervisors per FTE, and size of playing area per
child. Variables on the kindergarten level were constructed
on the basis of official information from the city of Oslo
and the Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training.
On the geographical level (Level 3), we included a
variable measuring economic affluence (log of mean score
on residents’ average income and fortune) in the neigh-
borhood (postal code) where each kindergarten is located.
Oslo is a city with considerable socioeconomic inequalities
among different neighborhoods (Ljunggren 2017), and
these inequalities might lead to selection effects in which
parents from different socioeconomic strata systematically
choose different kindergartens (Ball 2003; Yang Hansen
and Gustafsson 2016). Oslo has more than 630 unique
postal codes (and about 680,000 inhabitants), making it a
rather nuanced measure of neighborhoods. The data set
shows that public kindergartens are overrepresented in poor
areas, while for-profit and parent cooperative kindergartens
are overrepresented in affluent areas (correlation coeffi-
cients between neighborhood wealth and provider are
r = - 0.27 [public], r = 0.19 [for-profit], r = 0.15 (parent
cooperatives), and r = 0.04 [other nonprofits]). Thus,
geographical affluence may affect quality/user satisfaction
directly, and in addition, this variable indirectly controls
for the affluence level of individual respondents. Ideally,
we wanted a measure of individual affluence, but this was
not included in the survey. However, as most parents
choose kindergartens located near their homes, a strong
correlation likely exists between individual and neighbor-
hood affluence.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are summarized in
Table 1. A total of more than 22,000 users with children in
one of the 530 public, for-profit, parent cooperatives or
other nonprofit kindergartens participated in the survey in
2015. These kindergartens were located in 274 neighbor-
hoods in Oslo. Table 1 further shows that more than half of
the kindergartens were operated by a public provider, 23%
were operated by a for-profit provider, 8% were parent
cooperatives, and 15% were operated by another nonprofit
provider. As mentioned above, this distribution is fairly
similar to the real distribution of kindergartens in Oslo (see
also case description above).
Results
We present the results in two steps, the first of which
entails demonstrating the relationship between the provider
and the different measures of satisfaction, including control
variables on the three levels stepwise. In the second step,
multilevel models that include all control variables are
presented.
Table 2 displays user satisfaction (predicted probabili-
ties based on the margins command in Stata) with
kindergartens by provider and controlling for variables on
Levels 1, 2, or 3 stepwise. The table shows that satisfaction
with for-profit, parent cooperatives, and other nonprofit
kindergartens is significantly higher than satisfaction with
public kindergartens when controlling for Level 1 (age of
child and first year attending) and Level 3 variables
(neighborhood wealth). However, when controlling for
Level 2 (kindergarten characteristics) variables, the dif-
ferences in user satisfaction are reduced, particularly
between public and for-profit kindergartens, in which the
difference is no longer statistically significant.
Thus, certain kindergarten features explain differences
in user satisfaction. Looking more closely at the different
Level 2 variables, we find that food cost per month seems
particularly important. Excluding all explanatory factors
except food cost per month in the multivariate regression
models produces fairly similar differences between provi-
ders as in models controlling for all Level 2 variables.
Figure 1 illustrates the differences in user satisfaction
between public providers (baseline) and for-profit, parent
cooperatives, and other nonprofit providers with no con-
trols (‘‘dark-gray dots’’) and only including controls for
food cost (‘‘light-gray dots’’).
Figure 1 shows that differences in satisfaction scores
between public providers on the one hand and for-profit
and nonprofit providers on the other hand are reduced when
controlling for monthly food cost. Indeed, adjusting for
food cost, the difference between for-profit and public
providers is no longer statistically significant on four out of
five measures. The only significant difference is on the
measure of satisfaction with physical infrastructure, but
this difference is small (0.15 on a 1–6 scale) and only
significant at the 0.05 level—which is a rather weak level
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of significance in a survey with more than 20,000 respon-
dents. All measures of satisfaction generally follow the
same pattern, in which parent cooperatives and other
nonprofit providers yield the highest scores, followed by
for-profit and public providers. The substantive differences
are limited, but satisfaction with physical infrastructure
stands out somewhat. On this particular measure, adjusted
for food cost, users of parent cooperatives express 0.5 scale
point higher satisfaction than users of public kindergartens.
One possible explanation is that public kindergartens on
average are older and more ‘‘worn out.’’ Alternatively,
non-public kindergartens may be better at maintaining their
infrastructure. Unfortunately, we did not have data that
could measure such mechanisms directly.
Including all variables simultaneously does not alter
these findings much (Table 3). Across all analyses, satis-
faction is highest among users of parent cooperatives,
followed by other nonprofit kindergartens. For-profit
kindergartens do not deviate significantly from public
kindergartens when including all controls.
On Level 2, the share of educational supervisors, total
playing area (areal), total number of children, and children
per FTE are unrelated to user satisfaction, leaving food cost
per month the only Level 2 variable with explanatory
power. Controlling for all other variables, food cost does
not seem to be a very strong predictor of satisfaction.
Instead, we observe a weak curvilinear relationship,
whereby satisfaction is highest among those with moderate
food expenses (NOK 200–299). In alternative model
specifications where we replace monthly food cost with a
variable measuring satisfaction with the kindergartens’
focus on health and a healthy diet (as described above), we
observed a positive significant relationship (p\ 0.001)
with all dependent variables (results may be retrieved upon
request). A possible interpretation of these relationships is
that low food costs indicate poor food service and thus a
limited focus on health and a healthy diet, while too high
costs increase expectations beyond what is possible to
deliver.
On the neighborhood level, the results suggest that a
consistent positive relationship exists between affluence
Table 2 User satisfaction with kindergartens by provider
General
satisfaction
Educational
development
(Factor 1)
Care and
safe feeling
(Factor 2)
Information and
user influence
(Factor 3)
Physical
infrastructure
(Factor 4)
(No controls)
Public (baseline) 5.08 4.90 5.19 4.72 4.77
For-profit 5.26*** 5.04*** 5.31*** 4.85*** 5.01***
Parent cooperative 5.59*** 5.31*** 5.53*** 5.13*** 5.37***
Other nonprofit 5.40*** 5.14*** 5.40*** 4.97*** 5.18***
(Level 1 controls)
Public (baseline) 5.08 4.90 5.19 4.72 4.76
For-profit 5.26*** 5.04*** 5.31*** 4.85*** 5.01***
Parent cooperative 5.60*** 5.31*** 5.53*** 5.13*** 5.38***
Other nonprofit 5.40*** 5.14*** 5.40*** 4.98*** 5.19***
(Level 2 controls)
Public (baseline) 5.12 4.93 5.22 4.74 4.81
For-profit 5.17 4.98 5.25 4.77 4.96*
Parent cooperative 5.52*** 5.26*** 5.47*** 5.05*** 5.34***
Other nonprofit 5.31** 5.08* 5.33* 4.89* 5.14***
(Level 3 controls)
Public (baseline) 5.09 4.91 5.20 4.73 4.77
For-profit 5.24*** 5.02** 5.29*** 4.83** 5.00***
Parent cooperative 5.56*** 5.28*** 5.50*** 5.09*** 5.35***
Other nonprofit 5.39*** 5.13*** 5.39*** 4.96*** 5.18***
n 22,238 22,214 22,229 22,137 22,105
Marginal means from multilevel models. Entries are marginal means from multilevel linear regression models. Level 1 controls include age of
child and first year attendance. Level 2 controls include share of educational supervisors, areal, food cost per month, total number of children, and
children per FTE. Level 3 controls include (ln) community economic affluence
***p = 0.001; **p = 0.01; *p = 0.05; p = 0.1
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and user satisfaction. Kindergartens in affluent neighbor-
hoods receive more positive evaluations than kindergartens
in poorer neighborhoods.
The full models also suggest that general user satisfac-
tion and satisfaction with care and safe feeling (Factor 2)
are negatively related to the age of the child, and also that
general satisfaction and satisfaction with information and
user influence (Factor 3) and satisfaction with physical
infrastructure (Factor 4) are higher among those with short
experience (‘‘First year’’). In other words, a tendency exists
for parents with shorter experience to express higher sat-
isfaction compared with parents with longer experience.
This is not surprising, as one might assume that parents’
expectations for kindergartens increase as they gain expe-
rience having children in kindergarten.
Discussion
A key insight from this study is that most users of
kindergartens in Oslo are satisfied with the services they
receive, confirming earlier studies of user satisfaction with
welfare services in Scandinavia generally (Van Deth et al.
2007) and in Norwegian kindergartens specifically (Linde´n
et al. 2017; Christensen and Linde´n 2017).
Still, we see differences between institutional sectors:
Across various measures, user satisfaction is somewhat
higher among parents with children in parent cooperatives
and other nonprofit kindergartens than parents with chil-
dren in for-profit and public kindergartens. Extant studies
showing that user satisfaction is higher in private than in
public kindergartens did not differentiate between non-
profit and for-profit kindergartens (Christensen and Linde´n
2017). However, the present study suggests that private
kindergartens outperform public kindergartens mainly
because of nonprofit options, and in particular parent
cooperatives. This finding runs contrary to a study from
Norway suggesting that higher levels of satisfaction exist
with for-profit compared with nonprofit kindergartens, but
that particular study was based on a general survey on user
satisfaction with welfare services and had a limited number
of respondents with relevant experience (Linde´n et al.
2017).
The tight regulatory regime of Norwegian kindergartens
is illustrated by the finding that user satisfaction is not
affected by factors such as education of staff or number of
children per staff member, unlike the cited studies from the
US context (Phillipsen et al. 1997). The minimum stan-
dards are shared by all institutional sectors, and with a
fixed fee, so few incentives exist to increase staff above
minimum standards. Thus, the limited variation between
institutional sectors is likely to be caused by tight gov-
ernment regulations. Within the present regulatory regime
in Norway, food is the only service in which kindergartens
are allowed to charge an extra fee. Accordingly, the anal-
yses suggest that food service quality is one explanation for
differences among providers. The relationship between
food service and user satisfaction indicates the potential for
differentiation that exists when providers are allowed to
adapt services to users’ preferences. Sivesind et al. (2017)
Fig. 1 Satisfaction with child
care institutions in Oslo in 2015,
unadjusted and adjusted for
monthly food cost. Marginal
means from multilevel
regression analysis. Deviations
from public provider
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argue that administrative freedom and user choice are two
prerequisites for differentiation between provider types in
the Scandinavian context. This study suggests that non-
public institutions might use this regulatory freedom to
adapt to user preferences.
The fact that the city of Oslo does not use the freedom in
national legislation to adapt to user preferences suggests
that the municipality finds it imperative to cater to low-
income residents. A similar mechanism has been found in
studies from Sweden (Gustafsson et al. 2016) and Austria
(Badelt 1997). At the same time, the profit incentive does
not seem to drive for-profit providers to provide services
more in line with user satisfaction, nor do these providers
deliver services that parents do not like. The profit motive
seems to be less relevant in this regulatory context than
many stakeholders and scholars alike would presume (see
for example Petersen et al. 2018: 131).
The importance of food cost across different measures
of user satisfaction raises important questions about the
validity of user satisfaction surveys as an instrument to
measure service quality, at least in service areas where
users are next of kin and, therefore, have limited infor-
mation. Whereas it is natural that overall satisfaction is
related to food service, it is more difficult to find a logical
explanation as to why food service should be related to
satisfaction with, for example, ‘‘care and safe feeling’’ or
‘‘information and user influence.’’ The data suggest that
generally, satisfied users do not discriminate much between
various items in the survey; rather, they are satisfied with
‘‘everything.’’ Thus, one implication of this study is that
user satisfaction surveys have limited validity beyond
measuring a service’s general features. This interpretation
is in line with Andersen and Hjortskov (2016) who suggest
that users will often use heuristic tools to simplify the
world when answering a satisfaction survey and thus focus
on a more narrow aspect of services than the whole range
of issues that they are asked to consider.
After controlling for a host of factors, parents using
parent cooperatives and other nonprofit institutions gener-
ally seem somewhat more satisfied than users of public and
for-profit providers. One possible explanation is that given
that nonprofit providers are not part of a bureaucratic
structure and do not have a profit incentive, they are able to
provide services that are better tailored for the individual
user. This is in line with a traditional argument that non-
profit providers have satisfied users because they to a larger
extent than public and for-profit providers manage to fill
gaps in public services not filled by other actors, based on,
for example, religion. In effect, families choosing non-
profits may, to a greater extent than other parents, actively
be seeking particular services only offered by nonprofit
providers (Weisbrod 1998). This has been shown to have
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certain validity in the Norwegian school sector (Trætteberg
2018), but not in elderly care (Feltenius 2017).
There is, however, reason for caution when offering
such a hypothesis in the kindergarten sector in Norway.
First, there is a capacity limitation. In many places in Oslo,
and in Norway in general, there is not sufficient capacity
for parents to freely choose their preferred kindergarten.
Hence, it is unclear how many of the parents with children
in a nonprofit kindergarten actively have applied such a
provider. Second, currently more than 90% of Norwegian
children attend a kindergarten, but many of the nonprofit
kindergartens were established when there was far less
capacity. Up until just a few years ago, many nonprofit
kindergartens were established in order to increase capac-
ity, not necessarily to broaden the range of service content.
Moreover, the more or less systematic differences between
the different satisfaction measures analyzed in this paper
suggest that there are some unidentifiable features of the
nonprofit providers and their match with the users that
make their score superior.
One such feature, based on the stakeholder theory as
formulated by Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (1991), is that
when lacking a profit motive, entrepreneurs establishing
nonprofit services must be driven by an alternative incen-
tive, such as a dedication to provision and quality for the
users. The prime example of this is when the users them-
selves become owners through cooperatives (Van Puyvelde
et al. 2012), like the parent cooperatives. Moreover,
Enjolras (2009) argues that nonprofits may reinforce a
norm of reciprocity that make it possible to pool resources
and facilitate collective action. In this way, the values and
dedication of the entrepreneurs may be internalized in the
governance structure of nonprofit institutions. Our findings
are compatible with these theories, even if they do not
constitute a test that makes us able to rule out alternative
explanations.
Some scholars have argued that the role of nonprofit
institutions as autonomous and distinct from their public
and for-profit peers, stemming from their member-based,
democratic organization (Eika˚s and Selle 2002), has been
in decline as the nonprofit sector has been caught up in the
marketization of the welfare field and lost much of its
ideological force and operational distinctiveness (Selle
2016). Since we do not have time series data, we cannot
rule out this possibility, but the results in this paper suggest
at least that the nonprofit sector is still a viable and
important component of the kindergarten sector, one of the
sectors where marketization has arguably gone furthest in
the Norwegian welfare model.
One limitation of the present study is that we do not
have information about users’ (parents) socioeconomic
background; therefore, we cannot rule out possible selec-
tion effects, i.e., parents from different socioeconomic
strata seek certain providers. However, we do see that
satisfaction is higher with kindergartens located in affluent
neighborhoods than with kindergartens in poorer neigh-
borhoods. The data also indicate overrepresentation of for-
profit providers and parent cooperatives in affluent neigh-
borhoods, while public providers are overrepresented in
poorer neighborhoods. A similar geographical distribution
between public and private providers has been found in
other areas of Scandinavian welfare as well (Gustafsson
et al. 2016), an important finding when assessing how to
approach the trade-off between tight regulation that does
not provide room for providers to develop distinct services
in line with user preferences and the traditional values of
equity in quality. If more lenient regulation provides more
differentiation between providers in the welfare mix, and
non-public kindergarten providers gravitate to affluent
neighborhoods, the role of public welfare services as a tool
for creating social equality might be undermined.
Extant studies have found that it is difficult to identify dif-
ferences betweenproviders,whichhavebeenattributed to tight
regulation. Our case study shows how only a minor opening in
regulation (food service) might create room for flexibility that
non-public providers exploit to adapt services to users’ pref-
erences. Given that inherent differences exist among public,
for-profit, and nonprofit providers, Scandinavian governments
must make decisions not only about the share of different
sectors in the welfare mix, but also about the latitude that these
sectors should have to develop distinct services.
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Table 4 Principal component factor analysis: varimax rotation
Variable Educational
development
(Factor 1)
Care and safe
feeling
(Factor 2)
Information and
user influence
(Factor 3)
Physical
infrastructure
(Factor 4)
Does the day care center stimulate your child’s interest in
numbers and geometrics (understanding of math)?
0.698 0.187 0.231 0.176
Does the day care center staff stimulate your child’s curiosity
and desire to learn?
0.682 0.352 0.314 0.215
Does the day care center ensure variety is provided in activities
and learning in different areas?
0.673 0.303 0.322 0.317
Does the day care center contribute to your child’s motor and
physical development?
0.665 0.287 0.257 0.332
Does the day care center provide a diversity of play activities? 0.655 0.311 0.291 0.352
Does the day care center encourage your child to act and think
independently?
0.644 0.331 0.242 0.213
Does the day care center contribute to your child’s language
development and Norwegian skills?
0.586 0.339 0.304 0.263
Does the day care center contribute to your child’s social
development (e.g., friendship, empathy and consideration for
others)?
0.566 0.522 0.254 0.205
Does your child trust and have confidence in the staff at the day
care center?
0.259 0.756 0.224 0.172
Is your child happy at the day care center? 0.349 0.743 0.049 0.146
Does the day care center staff have a caring attitude toward
your child?
0.215 0.706 0.380 0.235
Are the day care center’s staff members friendly and
encouraging?
0.159 0.677 0.421 0.239
Does your child have good relationships with the other children
at the day care center?
0.440 0.621 - 0.066 0.065
Have you found that staff members have the time to provide
support and help when your child needs it?
0.293 0.607 0.413 0.275
In your opinion, do the day care center staff members have the
necessary qualifications?
0.302 0.546 0.431 0.328
Do you receive information relating to activities at the day care
center?
0.336 0.303 0.669 0.198
Do you receive information regarding how your child is doing
at the day care center?
0.324 0.401 0.647 0.158
Are you adequately informed about changes in the day care
center’s staff?
0.259 0.192 0.637 0.253
Do you have a good dialogue with the day care center regarding
your child’s development?
0.400 0.337 0.633 0.147
Do you receive information regarding the day care center’s
joint parents committee (Samarbeidsutvalg/FAU)?
0.265 0.055 0.632 0.122
Does the day care center have indoor facilities and equipment
that encourage and promote development, play and learning?
0.332 0.157 0.134 0.771
Does the day care center have outdoor facilities that encourage
and promote development, play, and learning?
0.273 0.096 0.075 0.758
Is the day care center clean and are hygiene standards good? 0.154 0.255 0.246 0.692
Is the day care center a safe and secure venue? 0.180 0.376 0.215 0.684
Is the day care center focused on health and a healthy diet? 0.470 0.111 0.288 0.353
Do you think that the staff members communicate well in
Norwegian?
0.129 0.339 0.286 0.334
Eigenvalue 13.338 1.416 1.154 1.062
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